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A Puzzle about the Senses

‘I have been in the habit of misusing the order of nature. For‘the proper purpose of [...] sensory perceptions [...] is simply to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful [...];
and to this extent they are sufficiently clear and distinct.
But I misuse them by treating them as reliable touchstones for immediate judgements about the essential nature of the bodies located outside us;
yet this is an area where they provide only very obscure information.’

\citep[pp.~57-8]{descartes:1985_csm2}

Descartes, Meditation IV

Sensations can have valence without representing anything

Sensory perceptions of tastes, smells, sounds, heat, cold, light, colors and the like ‘do not represent anything located outside our thought’

These sensory perceptions ‘vary according to the different movements which pass from all parts of our body to the ... brain’

Principles

(\citealp[p.~ 219, AT VIII:35]{descartes:1985_csm1} cited by \citealp[p.~348]{simmons:1999_are})
Sensations vs representations

‘Something which I thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind’

(Meditation 2).

Is Descartes’ consistent?

Simmons shows us that Descartes is not super consistent ...

Sensory perceptions of tastes, smells, sounds, heat, cold, light, colors and the like ‘do not represent anything located outside our thought’

Principles

‘the proper purpose of [...] sensory perceptions [...] is simply to inform the mind of what is beneficial or harmful’

How can you inform if you do not represent? By being aversive or pleasurable.

Sensory perceptions ‘normally tell us of the benefit or harm that external bodies may do [...], and do not, except [...]accidentally, show us what external bodies are like in themselves’

(\citealp[p.~224, AT VIII: 41]{descartes:1985_csm1} cited by \citealp[p.~350]{simmons:1999_are}).
How can you *tell* and *show* if you do not represent? Tell: it’s just a matter of creating something averive. Show: you cannot!

‘pain will be felt as if it were in the foot [...] deception of the senses is natural’

‘[the intellect] must not judge that external things always are just as they appear to be.’ (Rule 12)

Inconsistent tetrad:

1. Sensory perceptions represent things.

2. What can represent can misrepresent.

3. Anything that can misrepresent can be a source of error.

4. Sensory perceptions cannot be a source of error.

Could both claims be true?
Further evidence of the contradiction

External bodies
‘may not exist in a way that
exactly corresponds with my sensory grasp of them,

for in many cases the
grasp of the senses
is very obscure and confused.

Mere sensations could not grasp.

But at least they possess all the properties which I clearly and distinctly understand,

that is all those which, viewed in general terms, are comprised within the subject matter of pure mathematics.’

Further & further evidence of the contradiction
‘We should note here that the intellect can never be deceived by any experience, provided that when the object is presented to it, it intuits it in a fashion exactly corresponding to the way in which it possesses the object, either within itself or in the imagination. Furthermore, it must not judge that the imagination faithfully represents the objects of the senses, or that the senses take on the true shapes of things, or in short that external things always are just as they appear to be. In all such cases we are liable to go wrong, as we do for example when we take as gospel truth a story which someone has told us; or as someone who has jaundice does when, owing to the yellow tinge of his eyes, he thinks everything is coloured yellow; or again, as we do when our imagination is impaired (as it is in depression) and we think that its disordered images represent real things. But the understanding of the wise man will not be deceived in such cases: while he will judge that whatever comes to him from his imagination really is depicted in it, he will never assert that it passes, complete and unaltered, from the external world to his senses, and from his senses to the corporeal imagination’ (Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule 12) \citep[p.~47, AT X:423]{descartes:1985_csm1}.

‘the intellect can never be deceived by any experience, provided that when the object is presented to it, it intuits it in a fashion exactly corresponding to the way in which it possesses the object, either within itself or in the imagination.

‘[the intellect] must not judge that external things always are just as they appear to be.’

In all such cases we are liable to go wrong, as we do for example when we take as gospel truth a story which someone has told us;

‘... the the wise man will not judge that whatever comes to him from his imagination ... passes, complete and unaltered, from the external world to his senses, and from his senses to the corporeal imagination’

Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Rule 12

1. On Descartes’ view, do the senses represent things?

2. If so, how is it that the senses never misrepresent things? (Or, if they do sometimes misrepresent, why are they not a source of error)?

3. If not, why must we ‘not judge that external things always are just as they appear to be’?

\emph{Dilemma} On Descartes’ view, do the senses represent things? If so, how is it that the senses never misrepresent things? (Or, if they do sometimes misrepresent, why are they not a source of error)? If not, why must we ‘not judge that external things always are just as they appear to be’?

A resolution?

The optics suggests another idea ...
‘consider the reasons why [vision] sometimes deceives us. First, it is the soul which sees, and not the eye; and it does not see directly, but only by means of the brain. That is why madmen and those who are asleep often see, or think they see, various objects which are nevertheless not before their eyes: namely, certain vapours disturb their brain and arrange those of its parts normally engaged in vision exactly as they would be if these objects were present. Then, because the impressions which come from outside pass to the 'common' sense by way of the nerves, if the position of these nerves is changed by any unusual cause, this may make us see objects in places other than where they are ... Again, because we normally judge that the impressions which stimulate our sight come from places towards which we have to look in order to sense them, we may easily be deceived when they happen to come from elsewhere. Thus, those whose eyes are affected by jaundice, or who are looking through yellow glass or shut up in a room where no light enters except through such glass, attribute this colour to all the bodies they look at. And the person inside the dark room which I described earlier attributes to the white body the colours of the objects outside because he directs his sight solely upon that body. And if our eyes see objects through lenses and in mirrors, they judge them to be at points where they are not and to be smaller or larger than they are, or inverted as well as smaller (namely, when they are somewhat distant from the eyes). This occurs because the lenses and mirrors deflect the rays’ (Optics) \citep[pp.~172--3, AT VI:141--2]{descartes:1985_csm1}.

‘consider the reasons why [vision] sometimes deceives us.

‘those ... who are looking through yellow glass ... attribute this colour to all the bodies they look at’

Optics

Sensory perceptions of tastes,smells, sounds, heat, cold, light, colors and the like ‘do not represent anything located outside our thought

Principles

(\citealp[p.~ 219, AT VIII:35]{descartes:1985_csm1} cited by \citealp[p.~348]{simmons:1999_are})
They do represent. But what they represent is somehow internal to the mind. Maybe what they represent is that the mind has been excited by an external stimulus of some kind.
Maybe this is what Descartes has in mind, and why he appears to go backwards and forwards on the issue of representation.
But this interpretation has two problems. First, it is implausible (because of the scientific discoveries mentioned earlier). Second, where there is representation, even of things within the mind, there is surely the possibility of misrepresentation.
Regardless of whether Descartes has a consistent, or even defensible, view on sensory perception, he is responsible for two big insights ....

Descartes’ big insights

1. The intellect is independent of sensory perceptions: it does not have to accept the principles implicit in perceptual processes.

2. We can explain why perceptual processes implicitly rely on principles which sometimes yield misrepresentations by appeal to the proper purpose of sensory perception.